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OPINION OF THE COURT 
   
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 Michael Hester was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm following 
the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress. At sentencing, the District Court 
applied a four-level enhancement to Hester’s Guidelines range under the theory that 
Hester’s possession itself constituted New Jersey evidence tampering. In light of the 
District Court’s uncertainty regarding the proper application of the enhancement, the court 
varied downward to mitigate its effect, and sentenced Hester to 86 months’ imprisonment. 
Hester appeals both the denial of the motion to suppress and the application of the 
enhancement at sentencing. 
 For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the denial of the motion to suppress. 
However, we hold that the application of the evidence tampering sentencing enhancement 
was erroneous. Accordingly, we will vacate the sentence and remand to permit 
resentencing.  
I 
 On October 7, 2014 around 11:40 p.m., Hiddayah Muse parked a car in front of a 
corner store in Newark, New Jersey, in close proximity to a crosswalk. Muse left the car 
idling while she entered the store, with Appellant Michael Hester waiting in the passenger 
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seat. Meanwhile, four officers in two police cars—one marked, one not—were on patrol in 
the area and noticed that the idling vehicle was illegally parked fewer than twenty-five feet 
from the crosswalk.1  
The officers remained to investigate in light of the parking violation and the 
vehicle’s location in front of a store with a known history of narcotics sales. Several of the 
officers had specific knowledge of the store’s history. One had made multiple drug arrests 
there; another testified that he was “very familiar” with the store because it had “been the 
subject of many investigations” connected to “distribution of many various narcotics.” 
App. 242. The officers also knew that the store had a buzzer system, which would allow 
staff to deny them permission to enter without a warrant.   
 As soon as Muse exited the store and re-entered the vehicle, the marked police car 
pulled up along the driver’s side of the car, and the unmarked car pulled up behind it. The 
officers exited their cruisers and approached both sides of the vehicle on foot. One of the 
officers from the marked police car approached Muse at the driver’s side window; the other 
three approached and stood at the passenger’s side of the vehicle—in this case, on Hester’s 
side.  
 When an officer began his questioning of Muse, she admitted that she did not have 
a driver’s license and that the car was not registered in her name. At that point, the officer 
directed Muse to turn off the engine and step out of the car. Hester—who had remained in 
the passenger seat as the officers pulled up, approached the car on foot, and began 
                                              
1  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-138(e). 
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questioning Muse—interjected, “We’re good, officer. I can drive.” App. 11. Hester then 
began to rise and exit the vehicle but, as he did so, one of the officers heard what sounded 
to him like the familiar thud of a gun hitting the floorboards of a vehicle. Another officer, 
who had been observing Hester’s hands and testified to seeing him drop the gun, verbally 
alerted the other officers to the presence of a weapon. At the verbal signal, Hester attempted 
to run, but one officer reached for and caught Hester’s shirt and Hester was quickly 
apprehended. In the interim, one of the officers near the vehicle confirmed the presence of 
a gun at the foot of the passenger’s seat and remained with the weapon per police protocol. 
Hester was then arrested and taken into custody. Because of the rapid turn of events, the 
officers did not search Muse and ultimately allowed her to drive away, notwithstanding her 
lack of a license to drive the vehicle.2  
 Because Hester had previously been convicted of a felony, he was indicted for being 
a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Hester moved to suppress 
the firearm, arguing that the police had seized him the moment that they parked, with lights 
flashing,3 alongside and behind the car in which he sat, and that the stop had not been 
                                              
2 The officers testified that they gave Muse a parking ticket. No corroborating 
evidence exists in the city’s record-keeping system, and the officers could not (or did not) 
produce any evidence indicating they had done so.  
 
3  The District Court found that the officers “had not turned on their overhead 
lights[.]” App. 10. But one officer testified that the unmarked vehicle did not have overhead 
lights, though it did have interior and rear lights. That officer also testified that they would 
“customarily” activate available lights so as to clarify that police were present. App. 253. 
Yet the Court made no findings as to whether the unmarked cruiser’s internal or rear lights 
were activated. The District Court also failed to make reference to the incident report noting 
that the officers had in fact activated the emergency lights. Although these open questions 
remain, we do not resolve them or decide whether the District Court erred in failing to 
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supported by reasonable suspicion. The District Court denied the motion, concluding that 
the interaction with the police up until Hester’s attempt to flee was a consensual encounter. 
In the alternative, the District Court determined that, even if it assumed Hester had been 
seized when the officers boxed in the vehicle, such seizure was a Terry stop supported by 
reasonable suspicion because the car was illegally parked in front of a known narcotics 
front late at night in a high crime area. The parties thereafter stipulated to the facts and 
proceeded by bench trial. Hester was convicted on the sole count of the indictment.  
At Hester’s sentencing, the parties disputed the applicable Guidelines range. The 
pre-sentence report calculated an offense level of 26, which included a four-level 
enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with another felony. U.S.S.G. 
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Without the enhancement, the applicable Guidelines range would have 
been 84 to 105 months; with the enhancement, the range increased to 120 to 150 months. 
The Government sought the enhancement on the grounds that Hester’s cousin had 
previously used the same firearm in an unrelated crime and had given it to Hester for 
disposal. In support of this theory, the Government cited recordings of calls Hester made 
to relatives from jail in which he expressed regret that he had still been in possession of the 
firearm when he encountered the officers, having intended to dispose of it. The 
Government argued that this was tantamount to evidence tampering, a separate felony 
under New Jersey law. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:28-6.  
                                              
resolve them, as we ultimately conclude that answering these factual questions would not 
alter our outcome.  
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 Although the District Court twice described the Government’s proposed application 
of the sentencing enhancement as “a little crazy,” the Court nevertheless applied the 
enhancement. App. 357. To mitigate its effect, however, the Court varied downward by 
four offense levels—the exact number added by the enhancement. The District Court 
sentenced Hester to 86 months’ imprisonment, the Guidelines range that would have 
applied without the enhancement was 84 to 105 months. 
 Hester timely appealed both the denial of the motion to suppress and his sentence. 
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Our review of the denial of 
a motion to suppress is for clear error as to the District Court’s findings of fact, and plenary 
as to legal conclusions in light of those facts. United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 439 (3d 
Cir. 2013).   
III 
“Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable and are 
therefore prohibited under the Fourth Amendment, unless an exception applies.” United 
States v. Mundy, 621 F.3d 283, 287 (3d Cir. 2010). One such exception to the warrant 
requirement permits brief, investigatory seizures commonly called “Terry stops.” Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A police officer may conduct such a stop “when [the] officer has 
a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot[.]” Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). However, this reasonable suspicion requirement is 
only triggered by a seizure, which occurs when an officer applies physical force or when a 
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person submits to an officer’s “show of authority[.]” California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 
621, 625 (1991); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, n.16.  
Consensual encounters, by contrast, “implicat[e] no Fourth Amendment interest.” 
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (quoting Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-
6 (1984)). They therefore need not be supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 
Such voluntary interactions occur when an officer “approach[es] an individual on the street 
or in another public place[,]” id., and a reasonable person in that position “would feel free 
to decline the officers’ request or otherwise terminate the encounter[,]” id. at 430.  
Relevant here, any evidence obtained incident to an unconstitutional seizure 
unsupported by reasonable suspicion “must be suppressed as ‘fruit of the poisonous 
tree.’” Brown, 448 F.3d at 244 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 
(1963)). Thus, the crux of the Fourth Amendment issue before us is whether the weapon in 
the vehicle was recovered either during the course of a consensual encounter or a 
permissible seizure, or if, instead, it was recovered during an unconstitutional seizure and 
must be suppressed.  
A. 
“[I]t is settled law that a traffic stop is a seizure of everyone in the stopped vehicle.” 
United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). We have so held, because a traffic stop necessarily entails the 
communication by police of a “show of authority” and, by virtue of a vehicle’s slowing 
down, ceasing to move, or refraining from reentering the roadway, submission to that 
authority. The circumstances under which a parked vehicle may be seized, however, is a 
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question we have answered to different effect.4  Two cases in particular are instructive 
here.  
In United States v. Edwards, two police cars pulled up to a parked, occupied 
convertible matching a description suspected to be involved in a crime. 53 F.3d 616, 617 
(3d Cir. 1995). One police car pulled in front of the convertible, and the second pulled 
behind to box it in and inhibit an escape attempt. Id. One officer exited his car and 
approached the passenger’s side on foot, and a second crouched behind his cruiser. Id. Soon 
thereafter, a third patrol car arrived, and a third officer approached with a police dog. Under 
that set of circumstances, we considered not whether the situation involved a consensual 
encounter or a seizure, but rather, a seizure or an arrest. We then recognized that the police 
conduct in Edwards was unquestionably a show of authority, at a minimum. Id. at 619. We 
ultimately held that the interaction was a permissible seizure that did not rise to the level 
of an arrest. Id. at 620.  
                                              
4 The District Court expressed incredulity at the idea that a police officer can 
conduct a “traffic stop” of a parked car. However, the court seems to conflate a “stop” for 
Fourth Amendment purposes with a stop in common parlance. But this concern is of no 
moment, as even the common, non-legal definition of the verb “to stop” describes the 
transitive verb as, inter alia, “to hinder or prevent the passage of[,]” “to get in the way 
of[,]” “to close up or block off[,]” and the intransitive verb as, inter alia, “to cease to move 
on[.]” See Stop, Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stop.  
 
Here, the officers requested that the engine be turned off, thereby preventing it from 
re-entering the roadway. Simply because officers did not pursue the vehicle or pull the 
vehicle over does not render that vehicle incapable of being “stopped,” in common 
parlance, or from seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Nonetheless, we need not 
address whether the interaction at issue in this case constitutes a “traffic stop.” Rather, we 
focus on whether the vehicle was seized.  
 
Case: 16-3570     Document: 003113098436     Page: 8      Date Filed: 11/30/2018
 9 
 
By contrast, in United States v. Williams, we held that police officers who 
inadvertently came upon an open, parked van in broad daylight engaged in a consensual 
encounter—not a seizure. 413 F.3d 347, 353-54 (3d Cir. 2005). There, the officers had 
stopped their vehicle twelve to thirteen feet away before approaching on foot. Id. at 349. 
Because “the van was parked in a public place with the rear doors open” in the mid-
afternoon, the officers could see the van’s occupant bagging a substance that appeared to 
be marijuana even from a distance. Id. at 354. When Williams noticed the officers 
approaching, he attempted to dispose of the bags, which the officers also saw. The Court 
ruled that this arms-length interaction was consistent with a consensual encounter by virtue 
of the obvious activity taking place in “in plain and open view.” Id. at 352. We held that 
the information gleaned in that instance was sufficient to support a finding of probable 
cause to search the van and arrest Williams. Id. at 353. But prior to such arrest, no seizure 
had occurred and, therefore, no Fourth Amendment interest was implicated. Id. at 354; 
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 429. 
Here, when Muse returned to the car, the officers drove up to it and parked around 
the vehicle, with the marked police cruiser at the driver’s side and the unmarked car behind. 
Only once the patrol cars were stationed at the perimeter of the vehicle did the officers 
approach on foot. The officers, too, positioned themselves around the vehicle, near any 
potential exit points—one officer at the driver’s side, and three officers on the passenger’s 
side. Against this backdrop, the officer nearest Muse initiated the familiar line of 
questioning typical of a traffic stop: he asked her for her driver’s license. 
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We conclude that the initial police conduct in this case is closer in kind, if not in 
degree, to the conduct in Edwards than to that in Williams. Here, Muse reentered the idling 
parked car, which would have been capable of leaving the scene, but for the change in 
circumstances signaled by the surrounding police cruisers and officers. Following this and 
the subsequent directive to turn off the engine, Muse assuredly would not have felt free to 
drive away, and a reasonable person in Hester’s position would likewise not have felt free 
“to ignore the police presence and go about his business.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437. It is 
this restraint on liberty that “marks the line between a fourth amendment seizure of any 
degree and a consensual encounter which does not require any minimal objective 
justification.” Edwards, 53 F.3d at 620. We conclude that the officers’ conduct falls on the 
seizure side of the line and is consistent with a show of authority.  
B. 
 Our seizure analysis does not end with our conclusion that there was a show of 
authority, however. For us to conclude that a seizure occurred, we must find that Hester 
submitted to that show of authority. The Government argues—and the District Court found, 
in the alternative—that Hester failed to submit to any show of authority and the interaction 
was, therefore, not a seizure. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626. We are unpersuaded. We 
hold that Hester had submitted to the officers’ show of authority when he waited in the 
vehicle with Muse prior to and during questioning, before Hester’s momentary attempt to 
flee once the officers became aware of the gun. 
In evaluating whether an individual has submitted to authority, brief, subsequent 
flight does not necessarily indicate an individual has failed to submit. We have held that 
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“not fleeing” in response to a show of authority suggests an individual has submitted to 
authority. United States v. Lowe, 791 F.3d 424, 434 (3d Cir. 2015). Indeed, we have held 
that simply remaining in place can constitute submission, regardless of subsequent flight. 
United States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651, 654 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding suspect had been 
seized after officers ordered him to remain, and he sat in a stairwell before fleeing “soon 
after”). Our sister circuits have reached the same conclusion under similar circumstances. 
See United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 744-46 (7th Cir 2015); United States v. Morgan, 
936 F.2d 1561, 1567 (10th Cir. 1991).  
By contrast, in our cases holding that the suspect had not manifested sufficient 
submission to authority, compliance was extraordinarily brief. In one case, the “momentary 
compliance” of a person who officers ordered to put his hands on a car was as brief as the 
suspect taking two steps towards the car in a feint, and subsequently dashing off. United 
States v. Smith, 575 F.3d 308, 315-16 (3d Cir. 2009). Similarly, we held that an individual 
had not submitted to authority when compliance was as brief as the individual responding 
“Who me?” to an officer’s request that he stop, before immediately running. United States 
v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 250, 259 (3d Cir. 2000).  
  Here, in considering the totality of the circumstances, we are persuaded that Hester 
submitted to authority while he remained in the vehicle prior to his failed attempt to flee. 
Hester’s short-lived flight followed a longer period of acquiescence. As previously 
addressed, Hester waited in the passenger seat when two police cars boxed in Muse’s car 
along the curb and four officers approached the car on foot, and he continued to wait as 
one of the officers questioned Muse, and ordered her out of the car. Unlike in Smith, by the 
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time Hester said he could drive, stood up, and tried to run, Hester had long since submitted 
to authority.  
C 
Having concluded that Hester was seized, our inquiry now turns to whether the 
Terry stop was supported by “reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity [wa]s 
afoot[.]” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123. Because we conclude that it was, we will affirm the 
denial of the motion to suppress.  
We determine whether reasonable suspicion existed to support a stop under an 
objective standard and a totality of the circumstances approach. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-
22; Brown, 448 F.3d at 246-47. That is, we consider whether “a reasonable, trained officer 
standing in [the detaining officer’s] shoes could articulate specific reasons justifying” the 
stop. Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 2003); see also United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). The “subjective intentions” of the officers do not 
factor into our analysis. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see also United 
States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 398 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Among the factors we consider, “[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized 
that a reasonable suspicion may be the result of any combination of one or several factors 
[including, inter alia] specialized knowledge and investigative inferences . . . [as well as] 
personal observation of suspicious behavior.” Brown, 448 F.3d at 247 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(quoting United States v. Nelson, 284 F.3d 472, 478 (3d Cir. 2002)). Sub-factors that 
indicate suspicious behavior include the suspect’s “[p]resence . . . in a high crime area[,]” 
“presence on a street at a late hour,” and behavior “that conforms to police officers’ 
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specialized knowledge of criminal activity.” Id. at 251 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).5 Although we evaluate each factor “in turn,” the relevant analysis is 
whether an officer would have reasonable suspicion given the “the whole picture.” Id. at 
247. Thus, even if any factor alone would be insufficient to support reasonable suspicion, 
the relevant factors, taken together, could nonetheless suffice. 
 Under an objective analysis in this case, many factors which may be independently 
insufficient constitute reasonable suspicion in the aggregate. Here, the officers observed a 
vehicle illegally idling near a crosswalk, in front of a store with a known history of 
narcotics-related activity, close to midnight, in a high-crime area of Newark. The officers’ 
attention was initially, permissibly attracted by the illegally parked car. Delfin-Colina, 464 
F.3d at 398. The officers’ suspicion could then reasonably sharpen because of the vehicle’s 
location and time of night. The vehicle was also parked in front of the known site of several 
narcotics investigations and drug-related arrests in which several of the officers had taken 
part. Because the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain the vehicle, including its 
passengers, Mosley, 454 F.3d at 253, the above considerations, taken together, amount to 
objectively reasonable suspicion to support Hester’s seizure.6 Accordingly, we agree with 
                                              
5 Cases to which Brown cites for support in cataloguing these relevant factors 
include Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); United States v. 
Bonner, 363 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2004); Campbell, 332 F.3d 199; Nelson, 284 F.3d 472; 
United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2000); Valentine, 232 F.3d 350; and United 
States v. Brown, 159 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
6 State high courts have occasionally distinguished between moving violations and 
parking violations.  See State v. Holmes, 569 N.W.2d 181, 185 (Minn. 1997).  In such an 
analysis, parking violations occasion less suspicion than moving violations.  Id.  Hester 
urges us to make the same distinction and decline to affirm the District Court’s 
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the District Court that, because the seizure comported with the Fourth Amendment’s 
requirements, Hester’s motion to suppress was appropriately denied.  
IV 
Having concluded that Hester’s weapon was permissibly obtained, we now turn to 
whether the District Court erroneously applied a four-point enhancement to Hester’s 
Guidelines calculation pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). We review a district court’s 
interpretation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Keller, 
666 F.3d 103, 105 (3d Cir. 2011). We review a district court’s “application of the 
Guidelines to a specific set of facts” for clear error. United States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 
215, 219-220 (3d Cir. 2012).7  
The Guidelines provision at issue here provides for a four-point increase of a 
defendant’s Guidelines range calculation, where the defendant “used or possessed any 
firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense; or possessed or 
transferred any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it 
would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense[.]” U.S.S.G. § 
2K2.1(b)(6)(B). We have previously held that the “[p]roper application of the four-level 
enhancement under [U.S.S.G.] § 2K2.1(b)(6) requires finding, by a preponderance of the 
                                              
determination that the officers had reasonable suspicion to support the seizure. However, 
the nature of the violation—whether traffic or parking—was merely one factor among 
many at issue, and we do not today address whether a mere parking violation would be 
sufficient to support reasonable suspicion. 
 
7 The Government argues that Hester’s objections at sentencing did not properly 
preserve his claim of error as to the enhancement. We conclude that Hester has sufficiently 
objected to the application of the enhancement for us to regard the claim as preserved. 
Case: 16-3570     Document: 003113098436     Page: 14      Date Filed: 11/30/2018
 15 
 
evidence . . . that the defendant committed another felony offense.” United States v. West, 
643 F.3d 102, 110 (3d Cir. 2011). 
We conclude that the District Court’s application of the sentencing enhancement for 
the purported commission of New Jersey evidence tampering was erroneous for two 
reasons. First, the District Court’s application of the enhancement to the specific facts of 
this case was clearly erroneous, because the Government did not show by a preponderance 
of the evidence that Hester had committed New Jersey evidence tampering. Second, the 
District Court incorrectly interpreted the Guidelines provision, as a matter of law, by 
finding that the possession itself—which was coextensive with the alleged secondary 
felony—occurred “in connection with” the subsequent felony offense. We hold that the 
application of the enhancement in such a manner is erroneous under any circumstances. 
A 
 Even if the only issue before this Court were whether Hester had tampered with 
evidence, the Government did not meet its burden to show that Hester committed such a 
crime. The secondary offense at issue during sentencing was tampering with evidence 
under New Jersey law. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:28-6. The New Jersey Supreme Court has held 
that “the crime of tampering with evidence of a possessory crime includes as a necessary 
element the permanent alteration, loss, or destruction of the evidence itself.” State v. 
Mendez, 814 A.2d 1043, 1049 (N.J. 2002) (emphasis added). The Government could not 
establish that Hester had effectuated the loss or destruction of the weapon, precisely 
because the Government did recover it.  
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Therefore, in order for the enhancement to apply, the Government would have had 
to show that Hester effectuated the permanent alteration of the gun in a manner that 
deprived the police of its evidentiary value, or that he took affirmative steps to do so. See 
id. The Government argues that Hester attempted to tamper with evidence, by virtue of his 
apparent intention to dispose of the gun, expressed after-the-fact in telephone conversations 
while Hester was incarcerated. But we cannot agree that ex post expressions of regret about 
not having committed a potentially criminal act amounts to an attempt to commit that same 
criminal act. Accordingly, because the Government failed to meet its burden to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Hester committed or attempted to commit evidence 
tampering as defined by New Jersey law, the District Court committed clear error by 
applying the sentencing enhancement to the facts in this case. 
B 
 However, even without regard to whether the Government met its burden to show 
that Hester tampered with evidence, the sentencing enhancement under (b)(6)(B) would 
not apply to Hester’s circumstances as a matter of law. The Guidelines provide for a four-
point offense level enhancement “[i]f the defendant . . . used or possessed any firearm or 
ammunition in connection with another felony offense; or possessed or transferred any 
firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used 
or possessed in connection with another felony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) 
(emphasis added). Supreme Court precedent, this Court’s case law, and the Guidelines all 
make clear that, in this particular context, the phrase to use or possess “in connection with” 
means the facilitation of the secondary felony offense. 
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In Smith v. United States, the Supreme Court expressed concern that this 
enhancement, as enshrined in an earlier analogous provision, would be erroneously applied 
to defendants who committed subsequent felonies while merely also possessing a firearm. 
508 U.S. 223, 237-38 (1993). There, the Court emphasized that “the gun at least must 
facilitate, or have the potential of facilitating” the subsequent offense for the enhancement 
to apply. Id. at 238.  
Following this decision, the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines was amended 
in 2006 to include, inter alia, Application Note 14, which clarified that the (b)(6)(B) 
enhancement applies “if the firearm or ammunition facilitated, or had the potential of 
facilitating, another felony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), cmt. n.14. Application 
Note 14 specifically cites burglary or drug trafficking offenses as those scenarios in which 
the enhancement might apply. Id. 
We subsequently agreed with this understanding of the enhancement, holding that 
it applies when the defendant has “committed another felony offense . . . that the firearm 
facilitated.” West, 643 F.3d at 110. We clarified that, in the drug context, the enhancement 
typically applies in situations of trafficking, whereas mere possession of drugs by a person 
who also possessed a gun was insufficient. West, 643 F.3d at 113.8 We further admonished 
more generally that our past precedent “should not be read to imply that simply possessing 
                                              
8 In so doing we joined the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, which make the same 
distinction.  United States v. Jenkins, 566 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690, 692-93 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Mansfield, 560 F.3d 885, 
887-88 (8th Cir. 2009). 
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a firearm during the commission of another felony offense is sufficient to invoke the 
enhancement of § 2K2.1(b)(6).” West, 643 F.3d at 115-16.  
In Keller v. United States, mere months after we decided West, we permitted the 
enhancement’s application where the firearm at issue had been used in the commission of 
a burglary. 666 F.3d at 107. There, we reasoned that burglary and felon in possession 
differed on an element-by-element basis. “[M]ore than mere possession of the firearm—
brandishment or other use—was an integral aspect of the predicate offense.” Id. at 106 
(quoting United States v. Navarro, 476 F.3d 188, 196 (3d Cir. 2007)). In reaching our 
conclusion we also relied on the 2006 amendment, finding that the Guidelines confirmed 
both that “facilitation” was a critical component of any predicate offense, and that 
“burglary” was the type of crime contemplated by the enhancement. Id. at 107.  
 Hester’s possession of the firearm did not facilitate or enhance his ability to tamper 
with evidence in the manner contemplated by the Guidelines. He did not brandish or 
otherwise use the firearm to tamper with evidence; he merely possessed it.9 Indeed, 
Hester’s purported evidence tampering was coextensive with the possession of the weapon 
itself. The Government argues that “Hester’s possession of the firearm was not an integral 
aspect of the evidence tampering offense.” Appellee Br. at 35. But had Hester not possessed 
                                              
9 Though we do not address whether or to what extent violence might be 
contemplated by the enhancement, the District Court recognized that “there [we]re no 
indications that [Hester] had [the weapon] with him because he intended to use it in some 
violent manner, just to be clear on that.” App. 375. We so state merely to clarify that the 
Government did not allege and the District Court did not find that burglary, drug 
trafficking, or conduct of the type contemplated in Guidelines commentary Note 14 was 
implicated here. 
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the gun, there would be no discussion regarding whether he tampered with it and there 
would also be no underlying charge.  
 Consistent with our clear precedent and the Guidelines commentary, we hold that 
applying the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement to a sentence for an underlying offense of 
possession of a weapon is improper when the alleged evidence tampering involves merely 
possessing that same weapon. Rather, in order for the enhancement to apply, the weapon 
must facilitate a subsequent felony offense of the kind contemplated by the Guidelines and 
our precedent. West, 643 F.3d at 110. 
V 
 We review criminal sentences for abuse of discretion in two steps. See United States 
v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2011). First, we assess whether there has been a 
procedural error in the sentencing process. Second, if we find no procedural error, then we 
review for substantive reasonableness. Id. “If we find procedural error at any step, we will 
generally ‘remand the case for re-sentencing, without going any further.’” Id. (quoting 
United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2010)).  
The improper calculation of the Guidelines range is a procedural error. Id. “When a 
defendant is sentenced under an incorrect Guidelines range—whether or not the 
defendant’s ultimate sentence falls within the correct range—the error itself can, and most 
often will, be sufficient to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the 
error.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016); see also Wright, 
642 F.3d at 152 (recognizing we ordinarily remand for resentencing without conducting 
any additional inquiry upon a finding of procedural error). Thus, the application of the four-
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point enhancement to Hester’s Guidelines range was procedural error, and we will remand 
for resentencing.  
In doing so, we recognize that we have, in exceedingly rare instances, declined to 
remand for resentencing where there are indicia suggesting “that an erroneous Guidelines 
calculation did not affect the sentencing process and the sentence ultimately imposed.” 
Langford, 516 F.3d at 219. We further recognize that, here, the District Court provided an 
explicit statement that it intended to rectify a likely Guidelines miscalculation when 
imposing the sentence—it set the parameters of the downward variance in reference to “[i]f 
that four-point guideline adjustment had not applied, [when] the range would not be 120 to 
150, but would be 84 to 105” months. App. 378.  
Despite these assurances, however, we ordinarily remand for sentencing upon a 
finding of a procedural error. Indeed, we have done so under similar circumstances, where 
a district court departs downward from an erroneously-calculated sentencing range to 
impose a sentence that seems reasonable, because “we cannot be sure that the district court 
would have imposed the same sentence if not for the errors.” United States v. Vazquez-
Lebron, 582 F.3d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 
205, 219 (3d Cir. 2008) (remanding for resentencing in a case involving an erroneous 
Guidelines calculation, even when the ultimate sentence imposed stood at the “lowest point 
in the advisory Guidelines range[]”). Though we recognize the District Court’s careful 
consideration of the effect of the enhancement, we will not rely on conjecture to conclude 
that the District Court necessarily would have imposed the same sentence absent the error. 
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Moreover, we will remand to correct the procedural error to ensure the “fairness[] 
[and] integrity . . . of judicial proceedings” and prevent the erosion of public confidence in 
our judicial system writ large. Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1908 
(June 18, 2018) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735-36) (1993)); see id. at 
9-10 (“Ensuring the accuracy of Guidelines determinations also serves the purpose of 
‘providing certainty and fairness in sentencing’ on a greater scale.’”). Although the 
Government maintains that remanding for resentencing would be a “pointless formality” 
on the facts of this case, Appellee Resp. to Rule 28(j) Letter, at 2, advancing these interests 
and ensuring Hester’s sentence is procedurally sound are neither pointless endeavors, nor 
mere formality.  
Because we conclude that the procedural error here is, in and of itself, “sufficient to 
show a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the error[,]” Molina-Martinez, 
136 S.Ct. at 1345, we will vacate Hester’s sentence and remand. 
VI 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Hester’s 
motion to suppress, vacate the District Court’s Judgment, and remand for resentencing. 
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